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1 Abstract 
This paper introduces the concept of a multi-robot community in which mul­
tiple robots must fulﬁll their individual tasks while operating in a shared 
environment. Unlike typical multi-robot systems in which global cost func­
tions are minimized while accomplishing a set of global tasks, the robots in 
this work have individual tasks to accomplish and individual cost functions 
to optimize (e.g. path length or number of objects to gather). 
A strategy is presented in which a robot may choose to aid in the comple­
tion of another robot’s task. This type of ”altruistic” action leads to evolving 
altruistic relationships between robots, and can ultimately result in a decrease 
in the individual cost functions of each robot. However, altruism with respect 
to another robot must be controlled such that it allows a relationship where 
both robots are altruistic, but protects an altruistic robot against a selﬁsh 
robot that does not help others. 
A quantitative description of this altruism is presented, along with a law 
for controlling an individuals altruism. With a linear model of the altruism dy­
namics, altruistic relationships are proven to grow when robots are altruistic, 
but protect an altruistic robot from a selﬁsh robot. Results of task planning 
simulations are presented that highlight the decrease in individual robot cost 
functions, as well as evolutionary trends of altruism between robots. 
2 Introduction 
As the number of mobile robots increases within our homes, industry, and for 
scientiﬁc exploration, there is an increase in the number of situations where 
many robots will have to work together within a common workspace. Such 
situations will promote the necessity for a peaceful and constructive Multi-
Robot Community (MRC). 
In this work, we depart from the situation in which a group of robots are 
designed, owned, or operated by a single individual or organization with the 
purpose of achieving a common goal. Here, an MRC consists of robots that 
may be designed, owned, or operated by several individuals or organizations 
that may have diﬀerent goals. Robots may be designed to act in their own 
best interest and accomplish their own goals without concern of the goals of 
other robots in the community. That is, robots in an MRC may be selﬁsh. 
This work proposes that robots in an MRC can achieve their goals more 
eﬃciently through the use of altruism. We deﬁne an altruistic robot as one 
which assists others in the attainment of their goals even if such actions may 
be harmful to itself. Speciﬁcally, if robots are willing to perform the tasks of 
other robots while decreasing their own eﬃciency in the short run, large gains 
in individual and global eﬃciency can be made over long time horizons. 
As an example, consider two autonomous robots commissioned to pick up 
courier mail from around the city. While these robots might be owned and 
operated by diﬀerent and possibly competing organizations, it may be in the 
best interest of both robots for them to accomplish each other’s tasks when 
appropriate. That is, if robot A’s pickup location is closer to robot B, then 
robot B should consider performing this pickup for robot A. This would be 
an altruistic action for robot B because it reduces eﬃciency without accom­
plishing any of its own pickups. However, robot A might later reciprocate 
this altruistic action, thereby building an altruistic relationship as a result of 
which both A and B may complete their tasks more rapidly or with less total 
distance traveled. 
In the next section, related work is brieﬂy covered. Section 3 deﬁnes a 
framework for an MRC as well as the problem being addressed in this pa­
per. Section 4 presents a method for robots to control their altruism within 
the MRC framework, highlighting the ability for robots to create altruistic 
relationships while protecting them against purely selﬁsh robots. In section 
5, simulation results are presented. Finally, conclusions and future work are 
provided in section 6. 
3 Background 
Multi-Robot Systems (MRS) have been an active area of robotics research [2], 
due to the several potential advantages over single robot systems. Namely, 
they oﬀer the possibility for greater spacio-temporal sampling, force multipli­
cation, and robustness to failure. Advancements in the areas of MRS mission 
planning, MRS motion planning, MRS localization, MRS mapping, and the 
most related subject of task allocation have occurred over the last two decades. 
3.1 Task Allocation 
Of particular relevance to this work is the MRS task allocation problem, in 
which the MRS must accomplish a set of tasks characterized by their geo­
graphic location. The problem is to determine the optimal assignment of task 
points to robots, along with the optimal sequence for robots to visit these 
task points that minimizes the time to visit all task points. This is a variation 
of the Multi-Traveling Salesperson Problem (MTSP), a problem with many 
applications but no polynomial time solution (e.g. [12]). Regardless, many 
good heuristic driven methods have been developed that yield sub-optimal 
solutions. 
One popular method of assigning tasks to robots in an MRS is to use a 
Market-Based Auction approach [6]. In this method, tasks are auctioned oﬀ 
to robots with the highest bids. Bids are typically based on the ability of the 
robot to accomplish the task, while considering the additional cost of traveling 
to the task site. While this method is not guaranteed to ﬁnd optimal solutions, 
it is eﬃcient and can lead to near optimal solutions. 
3.2 Altruism 
In the literature on robotics there are extensive treatments of cooperation 
among robots, but little mention of altruistic behaviors. Cooperation may 
in fact be altruistic, but it is generally not described in those terms in the 
literature. Examples of work involving cooperation are [4], [3], [10], and [8]. 
Work directly involving altruism includes that of [11] and [7] who describe 
robot behaviors in terms of a satisfaction index and transmission/reception of 
signals from other robots. A robots progress in a given task can be measured 
by its satisfaction in the task, which corresponds to the ﬁtness or performance 
index indicated above. Thus, a robot needing help with a task may emit an 
attraction “please help me” signal. Lucidarme et. al. [7] propose an altruism 
vector based on the satisfaction index of a robot and the signals emitted 
by other robots; a given robot decides on altruistic behavior based on the 
magnitude of this vector. Similarly, [1] describes a software architecture for 
robot colonies based on robot tropisms, deﬁned as their likes and dislikes. 
Reinforcement of particular behaviors strengthens them in future scenarios. 
Here too a robot can call for help to other robots when it needs assistance in 
moving heavy objects beyond its capability. 
The emergence of cooperative behaviors has been studied extensively in 
game theory, under the name Prisoners Dilemma, e.g.[9]. However, while the 
winning strategies in this situation call for cooperation, altruism is not in the 
discussions known to us. 
3.3 Reputation Management 
Reputation Management (RM) occurs when an agent evaluates the actions of 
other agents, forms opinions about those agents, and then uses these opinions 
to adjust its own actions. The ﬁeld of RM involves analysis of such processes 
with applications ranging from interpersonal relationships to economics. A 
survey or RM with an emphasis on its application to the online marketplace 
is presented in [5]. A related example can be found in [13], where RM is applied 
to the general area of ”Electronic Communities”. This work demonstrates the 
positive development of altruistic relationships in which the trust of other 
agents can be built up over time. This has close similarities to the application 
within an MRC, but uses the trust to assess the quality of information from 
other agents. Here, we use this trust to determine if robots should be altruistic 
to one another, thereby improving individual performance. 
4 Multi-Robot Communities 
A Multi-Robot Community C = {r1, r2, ..., rN } is a set of N robots that 
can interact through some shared workspace W . In this community, each 
robot ri will have a set of Li individual tasks to accomplish described by the 
possibly dynamic set Ti = {ti1, ti2, ..., tiLi }. Such tasks may include taking 
measurements, picking up materials, placing objects, etc. 
A task tij is considered to be completed if any of the robots within C visits 
the task location. Therefore, once tasks are assigned, each robot ri plans a 
sequence Si of task locations to visit that minimizes path length. 
Si = {tkn, tlo, ..., tmp} (1) 
where indices k, l, m, n, o, p are arbitrary at this point to reﬂect the possi­
th thbility that robot ri’s task sequence Si may include any of the n , oth, or p
tasks belonging to any of the kth , lth, or mth robots within the community. 
While diﬀerent task sequencing algorithms may be used, it should be clear 
that the eﬀectiveness of the task allocation is related to how close the planned 
sequences are to the optimal task sequence Si 
∗ . 
The cost incurred to accomplish a task sequence is calculated based on 
the 2 dimensional euclidean distance dkn,lo between two task locations tkn 
and tlo. Hence, a candidate for each robot’s personal cost function is 




Where wi has units s·m−1 and for this paper has value 1. Note that, instead 
of eq. (2), several other cost functions could be used within the altruistic MRC 
framework that follows. The global cost function typically used to characterize 







This cost function can be used to measure performance of an MRC. How­
ever, individual robots participating within an MRC will most likely use only 
their individual cost function described in eq. (2). Hence, controllers should 
be designed with such cost functions in consideration. 
4.1 Task Fulﬁllment in MRC 
A common approach taken for optimizing task allocation is to implement a 
market-based auction system in which robots place bids for tasks (e.g. [6]). 
Through inter-robot communication, each robot ri can communicate its bid 
on each task as it is auctioned. The task will be awarded to the robot with 
the lowest bid for that task. 
A robot’s bid on a particular task will be calculated based on the ability 
to complete the task in minimal time. For example, if τij is the time for robot 
ri to accomplish task j and all other tasks awarded in previous bidding wars, 
then the bid bij can be set to equal τij . 
In this work, each robot ri can auction any of its own tasks from Ti. Other 
robots can choose to bid on robot ri’s tasks, thus acting in an altruistic manner 
if they win the bid and complete the task. This choice is based on the level of 
altruism one robot may have towards another robot. 
To be precise, we deﬁne the variable αij ∈ [0, ∞] as the level of altruism 
robot ri has towards robot robot rj . A robot ri will bid on other robot rj ’s 
task tjk according to: � 
Ji(Si ∪ tjk) if αij > Ji(Si ∪ tjk) − Ji(Si)bi,jk = (4)∞ else 
The goal is to control this value of α such that robots will behave altruis­
tically towards one another. This will lead to robots doing each other’s tasks 
when more eﬃcient, thereby decreasing cost functions Ji. 
However, since robots are trying to minimize their own cost, they have 
incentive to act in a selﬁsh manner by maximizing the number of their tasks 
completed by other robots and minimizing the number of tasks they them­
selves complete. Hence it is not always beneﬁcial to simply set αij to some 
constant that ensures altruistic behavior (e.g. setting αij = ∞ ). Instead, 
robots can adapt αij on-the-ﬂy in response to the actions of other robots, or 
more speciﬁcally in response to the complimentary altruism, αji. 
When such dynamic altruistic behavior is allowed, analysis of the altruistic 
dynamics within an MRC is required. To do so, a standard discretized linear 
time-invariant state space model is proposed: 
αt+1 = Aαt + But (5) 
In this equation, α = [α12 α21 α13 α31 ... αij ]T is the state vector, t is 
INxN the time step, A = is the state matrix, B = 1 is the input matrix, 
and u = [u12 u21 u13 u31 ... uij ]T is the control input. While this implies a 
simple model, diﬀerent values for A and B are possible and may require more 
complicated control laws. 
� � 
5 Altruism Controller Design 
This section provides a controller for setting u in equation (5), that allows for 
mutually altruistic relationships to form. Before proceeding to the design of 
control laws for αij , it should be noted that the system assumes: 1) all robots 
can reliably communicate with one another to conduct auctions and bidding, 
and 2) all robots can either directly measure the altruistic nature αji of other 
robots. This second assumption implies that individual cost functions have 
the same units and can be compared. 
In the control strategy proposed, each robot ri will try to set its altruistic 
nature αij towards another robot to be that which the other robot rj has 
toward it. This is accomplished through the following proportional control 
law: 
uij = Kij (αji + �ij − αij ) (6) 
The control gain Ki > 0 determines the rate at which αij approaches the 
desired value of αji + �ij . The ﬁrst term in this desired value is the altruism 
that robot rj has towards robot ri. The second term, �ij > 0, indicates how 
much more altruistically robot ri will act towards robot rj . 
It is important to note that �ij is used to allow altruism to grow between 
two robots in that if both robots use such a control law, their complimentary 
values αij and αji will grow throughout time. Consider the resulting state 
model of the altruistic relationship between 2 robots that can occur, regardless 
of the other robots in C. Note that without losing generality, it is assumed 
K12 = K21 = K and �12 = �21 = �. ⎛⎝ ⎞⎠ = 
⎛⎝ ⎛⎝ ⎞⎠ ⎞⎠ (7) 1 − Kα12 α21 K K α12 α211 − K K K 
0 0 1 
t+1 t 
The stability of the system can be evaluated through a coordinate transfor­
mation e1 = α12 − α21. Given this transformation, the system can be restated 
as error dynamics: 
= (1 − 2K)e1t (8)e1t+1 
Hence if |1 − 2K| < 1 the error dynamics will be stable and it follows that 
the error (α12 − α21) → 0 as t →∞. 
Now, consider a desired rate of change of altruism to be K�, then the error 
in the rate of change of altruism is: 
= (α12t+1 ) − K� (9)e2t+2 − α12t 
Substituting the top row of eq. (7) into eq. (9) yields: 
e2t+2 = −Ke1t (10) 
(a) (b) (c) 
Fig. 1. Task fulﬁllment in an MRC when for all i,j, the altruistic nature in (a) 
of robots αij = 0% and individual robot paths must span large portions of the 
workspace to visit individual task points. In (b), αij = 5% and when αij = 100% 
(c). With altruism, robots tend to create more localized paths that demonstrate 
increased eﬃciency. Altruism are percentages of greatest distance a task can add to 
a robots path in the given workspace. 
Again if |1 − 2K| < 1, e1 → 0 as t → +∞. It then follows that e2 → 0 
as t → +∞. More explicitly, the rate of change of altruism (α12t+1 − α12t ) 
stabilizes to K�. 
Thus, for gain conditions 0 < K < 1, the mutual altruisms α12 and α21 
will both match each other and grow over time. 
If, on the other hand, robot ri attempts to be altruistic towards a selﬁsh 
robot rj , (i.e. αji = 0), then the state transition from eq. (7) reduces to: � 
α12 
� � 
1 − K K �� α12 � = (11)
� 0 1 � 
t+1 t 
In this case we can deﬁne the error to minimize with the transformation 
e3 = α12 − �. Substituting top row of eq. (11) into this transformation yields 
error dynamics: 
= (1 − K)e3t (12)e3t+1 
Hence if 0 < K < 1, then e3 → 0 as t → +∞, and it follows that the 
corresponding state α12 is stable. In fact, this behaves like a Proportional 
control system where � is the desired state. 
To note, the αij controller presented above is dependent on the reciprocal 
altruism αji. If robot rj can not be trusted, then its altruism must be esti­
mated based directly on its actions and any task point tik on which it bids. 
In this work, a conservative estimate is used: 
� 
max(αˆij,t, Jj (Sj ∪ tik) − Jj (Sj )) if robot j bids αˆij,t+1 = (13)min(αˆij,t, Jj (Sj ∪ tik) − Jj (Sj )) else 
6 Results 
To demonstrate the general eﬀect on an MRC when robots create altruistic 
relationships, a simulated task fulﬁllment experiment was conducted in which 
500 tasks were randomly created within a 6.4x6.4 m 2D workspace as shown 
in Fig. (1). Each task was randomly assigned to be within the task set of one 
of 8 robots operating in the space. After each of the 500 tasks are assigned, 
robots auction them oﬀ to all robots using an assumed wireless communication 
system. Robots will bid if they have suﬃciently large altruism towards the 
auctioneer. The order of auctioning is random. 
Fig. 2. Potential eﬀects of increased altruism within an MRC 
For each run of the experiment, robots had ﬁxed but equal values of altru­
ism. Between experiments, the altruism was incremented by 1% up to 20%, 
then incremented by 10%. In Fig. (2), the average robot path cost in meters 
is plotted for these values of altruism. Note that the values for altruism are 
normalized with respect to the percentage of the maximum value deﬁned as 
the greatest distance between two points in the workspace (i.e. the length of 
the diagonal connecting opposite corners). The path costs show a dramatic 
decrease when compared with the case with no altruism. The cost plateaus 
where additional tasks typically won’t cost a robot more than 20% of the 
largest distance a task point can occur on path cost for the given workspace. 
This can be observed in Fig. (1) as well, where in (a) no altruism results 
in paths that cross one another and the entire environment. However, in (c) 
where 100% altruism is used, paths are more localized and the personal cost 
functions decrease to the eﬀect that the global cost function is also minimized. 
To demonstrate the eﬀects of the control law, consider the case where two 
robots start with random values for altruism with respect to each other (e.g. 
0%, 18%). As shown in Fig. 3(a), the altruism between the two robots ﬁrst 
converges and then grows with time (i.e. as new tasks are auctioned). It can 
be noted that the rising slope calculated from Fig. 3(a) is 1/16 which matches 
the expected value of K� = (0.25)(0.25). 
When robots are acting selﬁshly, the controller invoked by the altruistic 
robot is stable, (see Fig.3(b)). The altruism towards such selﬁsh robots reaches 
equilibrium at the point � greater than 0. Hence, the altruistic robot is still 
protected against selﬁsh robots. Note that increasing the gain K increases the 
speed of convergence. In (c) and (d), cases where the altruism of other robots 
are estimated using equation (13) are presented. In (c), robot 1 has altruism 
ﬁxed at 100%. Robot 2’s altruism towards 1 starts at 100% and converges to 
the maximum bid used by robot 1. In (d), robot 1 has altruism ﬁxed at 0, it 
can be seen that robot 2’s altruism converges towards �. 
7 Conclusions and Future Work 
This paper presented the idea of a Multi-Robot Community in which several 
robots sharing a common workspace are attempting to complete their individ­
ual tasks. It was shown that altruistic actions, where robots assist with each 
other’s tasks, can lead to decreased path costs for individual robots. 
While a controller was presented that can set altruism such that altruistic 
relationships can evolve between two altruistic robots and still protect against 
selﬁsh robots, the real contribution comes from the idea of analyzing the 
stability of altruism as a linear time-invariant system. Future controllers can 
be designed and analyzed in a similar fashion. 
Considerable work is still required, especially to resolve the assumptions 
listed above. In the future it is hoped that better estimation of another robot’s 
altruism can be achieved, selﬁsh robots that have variable values for alpha are 
addressed (e.g. gaming robots), situations with uneven task distribution are 
considered (5 tasks for one robot 100 for another), and practical implementa­
tion and experimentation may occur. 
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